This study examines the influence and existence of anchoring bias, evaluates the a priori arguments and the evidence from the real estate market indicating the effect of investor sentiment on sales prices, and reviews recent models. As a sample, this study uses a unique dataset, which includes the complete history of actual transactions in the real estate market in Taiwan. Data analysis of this sample is conducted to determine whether real estate market participants can see through the bias; that is, whether homebuyers will fall into the anchoring trap. We find that anchoring is a phenomenon independent of the gender of homebuyers. Comparing different kinds of homebuyers and geographical regions reveals that experienced homebuyers and housing transactions in municipalities exhibit a lower level of anchoring. However, these potential cognitive biases of investors cause housing sales prices to deviate from their fundamentals. We expect that our findings offer new insights for future research.
I. Introduction
The anchor may be implicitly provided to the participants in cases in which it is clearly informative for the judgement at hand. For example, Northcraft and Neale (1987) demonstrated that real-estate pricing decisions depended on the listing price for the property. The price provided was either above or below the actual appraisal value of the property (e.g., $83,900 vs $65,900). Replicating the typical anchoring finding, participants' estimates for the value of the property were assimilated towards the provided anchors. Therefore, we can understand that the sale prices of residential properties are not necessarily affected by objectively measured property attributes, but by attributes that sellers and buyers perceive as factual. Even after considering the most of the factors, how much property price do buyers find reasonable? For the buyer of information asymmetry, which is a very difficult thing to do. The unique aspect of this study is the investigation of the above question when accounting for property characteristics and location. The literature on real estate has focused on the relationship between economic cycles and residential property construction or sales activity. Few studies have examined the relationship between investor behavior and real estate market trading.
The first goal of this article is to verify whether anchor bias exists in the real estate market. If there is anchoring bias, this paper will focus on what kinds of homebuyers sentiment more easily lead to the generation of anchoring behavior ? what its impacts to housing sales prices? Each house has its own unique set of characteristics that affect its value. Different bundles of characteristics make valuation difficult. In addition, certain housing characteristics may be valued differently across different geographical areas. Most real estate buyer suffers from information asymmetry, because real estate is a highly heterogeneous product, relevant information is difficult to obtain and residential properties are hard to value. Furthermore, real estate buyers have heterogeneous information; for example, locals know more about location-related information such as trends in growth, zoning, crime and so forth. From the above described we can know the price transparency of the real estate market is very low so the buyer needs to reference prices as their measure standard when buying a house. Precisely because the buy-side of such behavior likely to cause homebuyers prone to anchoring bias.
Judgemental anchoring is not only a particularly robust judgemental effect that has been demonstrated in a variety of domains, it also constitutes a basic concept that has been used to explain a wide array of judgemental phenomena. Anchoring effects pervade a variety of judgements, from the trivial (i.e.,estimates of the mean temperature in Antarctica; Mussweiler and Strack,1999a) to the apocalyptic (i.e., estimates of the likelihood of nuclear war; Plous, 1989 ). In particular, they have been observed in a broad array of different judgemental domains, such as price estimates (Mussweiler, Strack and Pfeiffer, 2000; Northcraft and Neale, 1987) , probability assessments (Plous, 1989) , evaluations of lotteries and gambles (Chapman and Johnson, 1994) . But the amount of research on the anchoring bias in real estate markets is very limited. Even if there are, most of the anchoring related researches do not use actual transaction data.
In this paper, we emphasize the influence and existence of the anchoring of the real estate.
The anchoring seems especially relevant to a bargaining setting such as the purchase of residential real estate, where (1) the selling price of the residential properties are not objectively determinable, and (2) a bidding process is used to arrive at the property's actual selling price. Alternatively, the anchor may be implicitly provided to the participants in cases in which it is clearly informative for the judgment at hand. For example, Northcraft and Neale (1987) demonstrated that real-estate pricing decisions depended on the listing price for the property. The price provided was either above or below the actual appraisal value of the property. Replicating the typical anchoring finding, participants' estimates for the value of the property were assimilated towards the provided anchors. Northcraft and Neale (1987) point out that the first value of the bidding process-the seller's asking or listing price-might serve as an anchor, effectively determining the neighborhood of appropriate prices for subsequent price negotiations.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. One of the most important differences between this article and previous literatures is that this study uses the willingness-to-pay as dependent variable. Because of the previous investor anchoring bias literatures does not differentiate the anchoring bias from buy-side or sell-side. As a consequence, a natural candidate for possible anchors in real estate price, listing price is generally considered to be the single most important variable in determining a real estate's price. This paper will more objective and clear variables to explore the anchoring of buyer-side in the real estate market. In the empirical method, we modify the hedonic model developed by Rosen (1974) to make predictions about the effect of anchoring on residential real estate values. In addition, this study adopts Heckman's (1979) two-step procedure to correct the self-selective bias. Given the documented robustness of anchoring bias, the model expects that buy-side could pay a premium because of higher level of anchoring, upwardly biased beliefs about price.
Unlike the previous literatures always use experimental design. In the present study, we attempt to fill these gaps by investigating the issue of investor anchoring behavior using a comprehensive record of real transactions from a major dealer in the Taiwan real estate markets. Thus, in addition to providing greater insights into the issues under investigation, our findings on the real estate market of Taiwan may also have important implications for other developing markets with similar characteristics, such as high prices deviate from fundamentals.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II documents the related hypothesis with literature reviews. Section III describes our empirical model, variables and the sample. Section IV reports the empirical results. Section V provides robustness checks.
Finally, Section VI offers some concluding remarks.
II. Hypotheses and Literature Review
A. The Anchoring Which Experimental Design Related Literatures More theory and empirical evidence always use experimental design rather than actual transactions data. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979) point out that people often use heuristics when making decisions and these heuristics can lead to incorrect decisions. One of Tversky and Kahneman's biases, called "adjustment and anchoring," builds on the work of Slovic and Lichtenstein (1971) , who find that (a) individuals carry in their minds arbitrary reference values (anchors) that influence estimates of value, and (b) value estimates will be insufficiently adjusted away from the reference point toward the true value of the object of estimation. Slovic and Lichtenstein (1971) and Epley and Gilovitch (2006) point out that the insufficient adjustment of the estimate away from the anchor provides the source of decision bias. In what is probably the best-know demonstration of anchoring in this effect, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) asked their experiment participants whether the percentage of African nations in the United Nations was higher or lower than an arbitrary number between 0 and 100. The participants then estimated the actual percentage. In an experimental research, Marsat and Williams (2009) found similar results when asking subjects to assess the fundamental value of a "real world" stock. The median estimate was EUR 26.0 when subjects were given the actual market price (EUR 36.76 ) and rose to EUR 39.1 when subjects were given a highly manipulated price (EUR 60.11). Both credible and "less credible" 2 anchors prove to have a biasing influence on the fundamental value assessment process.
Further work has shown anchoring evidence to be robust. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) find that the people still fall into anchoring trap even when they are rewarded for being unbiased. Strack and Mussweiler (1997) find that the bias still exists even when the anchor is unrealistic. Northcraft and Neale (1987) find that the cognitive bias remains when experts, armed with information, are examined (i.e., professional real estate agents). Russo and Schoemaker (1989) and Madrian and Shea (2001) find that the bias remains in real, as opposed to laboratory situations. And Wilson and Houston (1996) find that the bias still can not disappear after warning participants about the bias. Kaustia et al., (2008) point out that the anchoring effect "nevertheless remains statistically and economically significant, even when [authors] restrict the sample to more experienced professionals" As a consequence, we can know from above literatures, the important phenomenon documented by psychologists is the representativeness heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974): A person who follows this heuristic evaluates the probability of an uncertain event, or a sample, by the degree to which it is (i) similar in its essential properties to the parent population, (ii) reflects the salient features of the process by which it is generated (p. 33).
For example, if a detailed description of an individual's personality matches up well with the subject's experiences with people of a particular profession, the subject tends to significantly overestimate the actual probability that the given individual belongs to that profession. Therefore, the literature on anchoring-and-adjustment and the previous discussion on the ambiguity and limited for residential real estate give rise to the following a series of hypotheses.
B. Hypothesis Development
From the above literatures, we can know that anchoring bias that has been demonstrated in a variety of domains which full of highly information asymmetry, such as stock market (Marsat and Williams, 2009) and real estate market (Northcraft and Neale, 1987) . Consequently, we can expect the buy-side will generate the anchoring bias in the real estate market of price opacity and information asymmetry. The final sales price of the residential properties is bias, because residential real estate buyers suffer from anchoring effects. A prediction of our hedonic price model is that investors with prior beliefs biased on the high side are expected to set higher selling prices and consequently willing to pay a higher price. This hypothesis reflects the fact that investor sentiment leads to housing price deviate from fair market value, and thereby provides an obvious candidate for anchoring estimates of a property's value. Based on the above reasoning, we expect homebuyers anchoring behavior has a significant effect on selling price of real estate.
Hypothesis 1: The residential real estate buyers always fall into the anchoring trap.
From the above literatures have shown anchoring evidence to be robust, such as Strack and Mussweiler (1997) , Northcraft and Neale (1987) , Wilson and Houston (1996), Russo and Schoemaker (1989) , Madrian and Shea (2001) and Kaustia et al., (2008) , we can know anchoring is a common phenomenon. Therefore, we want to investigate further whether the gender will be the same result.
Hypothesis 1-1: Common anchoring heuristics difference between male and female. Diaz (1997) find that appraisers are influenced by the previous value judgments of anonymous experts was not found. The lack of support for strong anchoring is especially strong for experts. Diaz and Wolverton(1998) find that the non-professional homebuyers deeply affected by the impact of the anchoring bias. In other words, older homebuyers' house purchase experience and information accumulated is richer compared to young homebuyers. We expect experienced older homebuyers can away from the anchoring trap.
Hypothesis 1-2: Anchoring bias is robust to home purchase experience. However, financial outcomes always have an element of uncertainty. As long as there is uncertainty about market relationships, surprises are capable of inflicting big losses. As can be understood shortly after the financial turmoil, has a certain impact on real estate market. Since the start of the financial crisis, a period of great economic uncertainty and heightened geopolitical risk induce homebuyers faced with a high degree of information uncertainty. In addition, the impact of financial turmoil made the demand more uncertainty.
High uncertainty drives many investors to search reference prices as the basis when they purchase real estates. Therefore, it is then reasonable to assume that the homebuyers will fall into the anchoring trap after the financial crisis.
Hypothesis 2: (Systemic Uncertainty)--After financial turmoil, the buy-side of the real estate market has significantly higher anchoring behavior.
Spanned homebuyers could pay a premium because of higher search costs and time constraints. Turnbull and Sirmans (1993); Lambson et al., (2004) point out that out-of state buyers pay a statistically significant premium. However, higher search costs and time constraints attributed to asymmetric information thereby enabling spanned homebuyers fall into the trap anchoring. Thus, as long as spanned homebuyers are willing to spend more time to search to reduce information asymmetry can avoid pay a higher premium.
We expect spanned homebuyers in Taiwan will face the same situation.
Hypothesis 3: (Information Asymmetry 1)--Spanned homebuyers who are subject to more information asymmetry are willing to pay more.
As with the literatures mentioned they imply information asymmetry is the main reason to cause people to produce the anchoring bias. Most real estate buyer suffers from information asymmetry, because real estate is a highly heterogeneous product, relevant information is difficult to obtain and residential properties are hard to value. But the residential real estate located in the municipality can provide more information to homebuyers in order to reduce information asymmetries and search costs. We expect homebuyers who buy metropolitan area should pay the lowest premium and the selling prices will closest the fair market price. For the price-taking buyers is vitally time saving to search from seller to seller until the expected net gains from the search and buy process is maximized 3 .
Hypothesis 4: (Information Asymmetry 2)--The residential real estate buyers that target in the municipalities region confront less the anchoring trap.
The evidence presents a challenge to the efficient markets theory because it suggests that in a variety of markets, residential real estate investors pay too much or too little because of anchoring effects. This evidence also presents a challenge to behavioral finance theory because early models do not successfully explain the facts. The challenge is to explain how investors might form beliefs that lead to anchoring.
III. Methodology and Data
In practical application, the dependent variable in the model is usually a recent selling price, standing as a proxy for the value of the house. But standing on the buyer's point of view, the final sales price of the house is determined by the buyer and the seller jointly.
Therefore, sales price includes many complex noise, it is not suitable to be used as dependent variables to examine the buyers' anchoring behavior. To further resolve this problem, this research assumes that buyers and sellers have equivalent bargaining power.
Based on the research hypothesis constructed in the previous section, the current study empirically tests the investor sentiment under different regression models. This study considers the behavior of anchoring from a perspective different from that of previous research. Unlike the previous literatures, this study use the willingness-to-pay as dependent variable, which is defined as the final selling price of residential real estate minus price concession 4 because we think it is more rational dependent variable than use directly selling price of real estates. The final real estate selling price is determined by the bargaining power of buyers and sellers together. We hypothesize that market participants such as buy-side investors may be affected by anchoring bias when bidding for the price of targeted residential real estates.
The development of a detailed data set with transaction values, property characteristics, and buyers and sellers of personal information allows for a holistic approach in investigating the determinants of a property's transaction price. This study offers the most detailed hedonic price model developed by Rosen (1974) to measure the effect of investor sentiment on residential real estate values. Malpezzi (2003) presents an excellent review of the theoretical development behind hedonic pricing models. As he points out, the hedonic model is a way to estimate the value of composite characteristics of the house. This methodology is well developed and accepted in real estate and housing economics research. In the hedonic model, housing is considered a bundle of attributes, including site, structural, quality, location and market characteristics. The number and type of attributes embodied in a house distinguish it from other properties and determine its value. Therefore, in order to further investigate the anchoring behavior from the buy-side investors perspective and we use the willingness-to-pay of sales price of homebuyers as dependent variable. In addition, we consider a set of site and structural attributes, denoted as i S ；a set of location characteristics, denoted as j L ；a set of market factors, denoted as k M . We added additional a set of variable to test the anchoring effects, denoted as and r X a set of investor behavior variables, denoted as u P in the hedonic model. The linear regression equation can be written as: 4 It is defined as the original listing price minus final selling price of residential real estate.
where WP is the willingness-to-pay of sales price,  、  、 、  and  are coefficient, and  is an error term.
As Malpezzi (2003) discusses, the hedonic model arises because of a heterogeneous housing stock and heterogeneous consumers. Not only does each house contain different housing characteristics, but those characteristics may be valued differently by different consumers. Sirmans, Macpherson and Zietz (2005) discuss the issue of the proper functional form in hedonic modeling. Although there is no one correct functional form, they outline the advantages of the semi-log specification as (1) allowing for variation in the dollar value of each characteristic; (2) easier interpretation of coefficients as the percentage change in the price given a one-unit change in the characteristics; and (3) helping to minimize the problem of heteroscedasticity. In addition to the above described model setups, we take natural logs because selling price is highly positively skewed. Thus, our dependent variable is the natural log of willingness to pay. Therefore, the semi-log regression equation can be written as:
In addition to the using the semi-log specification, Box and Cox (1964) (Kutner, Nachtsheim, and Neter, 2004) . Essentially, the procedure calls for the standardization of the dependent variables such that the magnitude of the error sum of squares is independent of the value of pre-determined lamda (λ). Thus, a new dependent variable denoted as Box(WP) is created, such that:
Where:
The variable ( ) Box WP is then regressed on the predictor variable(s) with varying values of  . The value of  that provides the lowest sum of squared errors is considered the appropriate power transformation. The transformed estimate for this data is  and the dependent variable revised, such that ( ) ( 1) Box WP WP     .Therefore, the Box -Cox regression equation can be written as:
We then adopt Heckman two-step method to compute inverse Mill's ratio (MILLS) as φ(Φ -1 (Z it ))/Φ(Φ -1 (Z it )), where φ and Φ are the p.d.f. and c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution respectively. MILLS is included to correct for the potential self-selection bias in Equations.
Control Variables in All Equations

Anchoring Variable
(a) Buyer's reference price of land (BREFERP): We use t he announced average regio n of land value as t he Buyer's reference price of original residence real estate from the Dept of Land Administ rat io n, Minist r y of t he Int er ior of Taiwan. The higher reference price, the homebuyers are more willing to pay a higher purchase price.
According t o our developed hypot hesis, BREFERP is expected to be positively associated with WP.
Property Variables
(a) Number of units (UNITS). Sirmans et al., (2005) find that square footage is the next most used characteristic and typically has the expected positive effect on selling price.
Guttery (2002) found that square feet of living area consistently has a positive effect on selling price. The larger the real estate, the higher its price, therefore, UNITS is expected to be positively related to WP. Fisher et al.,(2006) find that units squared consistently has a negative effect on selling price. We allow for diminishing returns to the number of units as done in Fisher et al.,(2006) ,where the UNITS-squared will be negative in its coefficients. space associated with each unit. We expect the effect from SMLPU will be positive; the larger the open space (low density), the higher the price, but with diminishing returns to lot size, SMLPU-squared will be negatively associated with WP.
(c) Age of building(s) in years (LNAGE): Springer (1996) ; Guttery (2002) and Sirmans et al.,(2005) find that house age consistently has a negative effect on selling price. There is some variation in the coefficient estimates but there does not seem to be a discernable pattern of differences across regions. LNAGE is the natural logarithm of one plus house age, where house age is calculated as the number of years from date of build to residential real estate sale date. We expect the effect from LNAGE will be negative; the older the object, the lower the willingness-to-pay.
(d) Parking space (PARK): PARK is a dummy variable equal to one if the real estate is including parking lots, zero otherwise. Sirmans et al., (2005) summarized that garage never has a negative sign but it has been not significant in a number of studies. We expect PARK will be positive in its coefficients; the real estate including parking space, the higher WP.
(e) Shopping district (SHOP): Man (1995) finds that if the house is close to the shopping centers has significant effect on its selling price. SHOP is a dummy variable equal to one if the real estate is located in the shopping district, zero otherwise. SHOP is expected to be positively associated with WP.
(f) Number of bedrooms (BEDS): Springer (1996) and Sirmans et al. (2005) point out that BEDS generally have a significant effect on selling price. BEDS is expected to be positively associated with WP.
(g) Number of living room (LIVINGS): Chinese feng shui experts say that the living room is a popularity gathering place, popularity enough to be able to gather accumulated wealth.
Therefore, the number of the living room of two or more than two will not only affect the use of the real estate in other space also makes popularity is dispersed. LIVINGS is expected to be negatively associated with WP. (i) Price Concession (PRCO): Asabere and Huffman (1993) ; Springer (1996) find that the price concession increases, so do estimated selling prices. Price concession is calculated as original listing price minus the final sales price of real estate. PRCO is expected to be positively associated with WP.
(j)Time-on-the-Market (TIME): Sirmans et al.,(2005) summarized that time-on-themarket shows up in eighteen studies and was most often not significant. This tends to support the argument that the longer a house is on the market, the more likely the seller is to concede on the selling price. Nonetheless, it is also true that the longer a house in on the market, the more likely the seller is to find the one buyer willing to pay a higher price.
Time on the market is measured as the number of days between the date of the original listing and the date of a sales contract that eventually leads to the sale of the property.
TIME is expected to be negatively associated with WP.
(k) Commission (COM): Springer (1996) finds that selling bonus is positive and significant, further suggesting that sellers offer additional compensation for the purpose of increasing selling prices. Taiwan's current law requirements the maximum commission is 6%, so, if the ration of commission to selling price is greater than 6% will be considered as extreme value and deleted. COM is expected to be positively associated with WP.
(l) The first floor (F1): In Taiwan, an object located at the first floor usually shares the commercial potential for business. F1 is a dummy variable equal to one if the real estate is on the first floor, zero otherwise. In general, F1 is expected to be positively associated with WP. STORY is the total number of floors of buildings. STORY is expected to be positively associated with WP.
(p) Public amenities (PUBLIC): In general, public amenities including elevators, stairwells, audio visual rooms, gymnasiums and atrium gardens ... etc. Therefore, the cost of these public amenities must be shared equally by the buyers, it will increase the selling prices of residential real estate. Therefore, we can expect homebuyers do not like the high ratio of public facilities. PUBLIC is expected to be negatively associated with WP.
(q) The distance between new purchased and original house (DISTANCE): In general, the homebuyers are willing to pay a higher price to reduce search cost and information asymmetry. In other words, the buyer purchased the house with the original house farther away then he would be willing to pay a higher price. DISTANCE is the absolute value of the buyer currently residing in zip code minus the buyer's zip code location of the purchase of real estate. Consequently, DISTANCE is expected to be positively associated with WP. (2005) find that men are more overconfident than women. Barber and Odean (2001) find that women are indeed more risk averse than men. In other words, female buyers are more willing to spend more time gathering information to reduce the information asymmetry of residential real estate. BUGE is a dummy variable equal to one for a male buyer, zero otherwise. BUGE is expected to be positively associated with WP.
New Control Variables for Real Estate from Behavioral Finance
(b) Buyer experience (BEXP): In general, older buyers tend to accumulate more wealth to buy higher priced residential property. BEXP is expected to be positively associated with WP.
(c) Seller gender (SEGE): Barber et al.,(2007) evidence from the Taiwan stock market, both men and women are reluctant to realise losses. For the average investor, the proportion of gains realised is greater for men than women. Extended to the real estate market, we can predict this feature will not change. SEGE is a dummy variable equal to one if the seller is a male, zero otherwise. SEGE is expected to be positively associated with WP.
(d) Seller experience (SEXP): Compared to younger sellers, older sellers have the ability to sell more high-priced residential. SEXP is expected to be positively associated with WP.
(e) Spanned homebuyers (SPANNED): Turnbull and Sirmans (1993); Lambson et al.,
(2004) point out that out-of state buyers pay a statistically significant premium because of higher search costs and time constraints. Spanned homebuyers are more susceptible to information asymmetry, so they are relatively easy to fall into the anchoring trap.
SPANNED is a dummy variable equal to one if the buyers come from out-of state, zero otherwise. SPANNED is expected to be positively associated with WP.
But given the number of independent variables, the specification may suffer from multicollinearity. It's likely to be a problem given the interrelationships between the physical and the location attributes modelled in hedonic estimation, has also had considerable attention in the literature. For instance, Des Rosiers et al. (1999, 2000) give the collinearity issue particular attention and report the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) statistics, as does Simons et al. (2001) . Our tables report the VIF values for each of the independent variables. VIFs are based on the adjusted 2 R generated when one independent variable is regressed against the remaining independent variables in the regression equations. If any variable is orthogonal to all the other explanatory variables, then the VIF is 1.0. Judge et al., (1988) report a value of 5.0 as some indication of a severe multicollinearity problem. Bowerman and O'Connell (1990) and Neter (1999) point out that if VIF is less than 10, the degree of multicollinearity within an acceptable range.
Therefore, the   5.0,10 VIF  is an indication of some extent of multicollinearity within acceptable region.
Data
The research uses the hand-gathered data that details the information of the real estate suggests that the properties are relatively newer, especially compared with American (average of building age is more than 20 years). We can see that the average homebuyer preferred property's pattern is three bedrooms, two living rooms and bathrooms. 38% of homebuyers choose objects with nearby shopping district and more than half of homebuyers prefer have parking spaces. The average living areas that homebuyers required is approximately 43 pings. However, regarding the selection of the fourth floor, homebuyers tend to avoid because in the Chinese tradition the number four is an unlucky 5 Swieringa et al, (1976) , Uecker and Kinney (1977) , Gibbins (1977) , these literatures suggest that when coping with complex situations humans resort to cognitively tractable decision strategies known as heuristics.
III. Empirical Results
A. Sample Description and Correlation Coefficients
The representative heuristic is a cognitive shortcut made when individuals assess the frequency of a particular event based solely on the generalization of a previous similar event.
number, but the average is as high as 20.3%. This figure means that Taiwan homebuyers relative to the traditional Chinese people in terms of ideology in a more rational and objective. The average age of buyers and sellers are similarly about 40 years old.
［Insert Table 1 here］ Except for the correlation coefficient of DISTANCE (the distance between new purchased and original house) and SPANNED (spanned homebuyers) reaches as high as 0.928 (Spearman), the correlation coefficients of the other variables are much weaker. As a consequence, this study is less susceptible to the issue of multicollinearity problems.
［Insert Table 2 here］
B. Anchoring Effect
From the above section methodology described we can see the semi-log and the box-cox regression models have many statistical advantages compared to the linear regression model. Therefore, the interpretation of the follow-up study of this article will be mainly in the semi-log and box-cox regression models. More comprehensive, table 3 reports the estimated results for the three different models. To disentangle the anchoring effect on willingness-to-pay, we use the MI-DLA, announced averaged regio na l land values as t he Buyer's reference price of the original residential real estate.
Specifically,we are interested in testing whether the homebuyers with higher BEFERP are willing to pay more. We found that in all the three models, BEFERP obviously plays a statistically significant and economically important influence on WP (p-value=0.0801 and others p-value<0.0001 respectively). In other words, it supports our hypothesis 1 that the residential real estate buyers always fall into the anchoring trap, reflecting the transaction objects that with higher reference prices then homebuyers will be willing to pay a higher price to buy new houses. We also found that in semi-log and box-cox regression models, BR*ELDERLY have a statistically significant and economically important influence on WP (p-value=0.0097 and 0.0237 respectively), reflecting more house purchase experience in older adults compared to young people are less likely to fall into the anchoring.
Therefore, it supports the hypothesis 1-1. The last column of the Table 3 reports the results of anchoring based on gender. As we see, the coefficient on the BR* BUGE is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in the semi-log and box-cox regression models.
The interpretation of the coefficient indicates that female homebuyers have higher anchoring level than male. In order to carry out a check of our hypothesis 1-2, we subdivided the sample according to gender of the buyer into two sub-samples and re-run the model. Table 4 shows that the control variable of BREFERP is positive significantly associated with WP at 1% level in the semi-log and box-cox regression models.
Consequently, it support our hypothesis 1-2 that homebuyers are be affected by anchoring heuristics regardless of being male or female, but female homebuyers have higher anchoring level than male.
C. Financial Turmoil
In sample period, the empirical results show the control variable of TURMOIL is insignificantly associated with WP in all models. This implies that the impact of financial turmoil is insignificant toward willingness-to-pay among the examined households. From table 3, we can know about the difference of anchoring before and after the financial turmoil. As we see, the coefficient on the BR*TURMOIL is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in the semi-log and box-cox regression models. Consequently, it supports the hypothesis 2 that the financial turmoil increased the information uncertainty which in turn the homebuyers to rely more on the reference prices as the basis in their real-estate purchasing decisions. From the above results, we know that the anchoring behavior depend on whether homebuyers have adequate and reliable information.
D. Spanned Homebuyers
In addition, Table 3 shows that the SPANNED variable is insignificantly associated with WP in both the semi-log and box-cox regression models (p-value=0.1545 and 0.5262 respectively), as compared to the linear regression model (p-value=0.0156). It is inconsistent with the related findings in the literature in the sense that it does not full support our hypothesis 3 that higher search cost and more time constraints attributable to the information asymmetry may lead to spanned homebuyers to pay a higher purchase price. In this regard, it can be interpreted as the spanned homebuyers don't fall into the anchoring trap.
More specifically, we also use interaction term in the regression analysis to study possible whether spanned homebuyers are willing to spend more time to search for information and then they will reduce the relative willing to pay the price. Just as we predicted that the coefficients of SP*TIME are significantly negative in the three different regression models (all of p-value<0.0001 respectively). Consequently, these conclusions imply that spanned homebuyers possible pay a premium which come from search cost and information asymmetry. But if homebuyers do not want to pay a higher purchase price then they must spend more time to collect information to reduce information asymmetry.
That is, if the spanned homebuyers with heterogeneous prior beliefs and search costs see list prices but not the prices at which owners are willing to sell. The price-taking buyers search from seller to seller until the expected net gains from the search and buy process is maximized 6 .
Summarized the results above, almost all estimate coefficients for control variables in Table 3 and Table 4 are with the predicted signs, but some of the coefficient are found to be insignificant. The signs of SMLPU and PUBLIC mismatch our expected signs. About these variables mentioned above, we will discuss the detailed reasons in the following section.
［Insert Table 3 here］ ［Insert Table 4 
here］
Examining hypothesis 4, table 5 presents the results of buyers who originally lived in the metropolitan areas with high-priced residential real estates and bought low-priced ones.
Just as we predicted that the coefficient of BREFERP is insignificant in the liner and semi-log regression models. Therefore, it supports our hypothesis 4, reflecting rich information traders away from the anchoring trap. This implies that people come from the metropolitan areas to buy another rich-information areas can buy the more reasonably priced real estate. In other words, to some extent it appears that the real estate market is an inefficient market.
［Insert Table 5 here］ 
IV. Robustness Analyses
In order to check the robustness of our results, we further consider the problem of self-election bias. In the studied sample, there are 1,959 out of 6,956 buyer-side transactions that are spanned homebuyers who come from the regions with high-priced residential real estates to buy low-priced residential real estates. The remaining 4,997
cases are non-spanned homebuyers. To accommodate this potential selection bias, we use the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure: Using the computed inverse Mill's ratio as a control variable in the regression models to mitigate the self-selection bias.
Our results in Table 6 show that the inverse Mill's ratio, as a control for the selectivity issue, has nothing to do with the obtained results. The results are qualitatively similar in the sense that the relationships between BREFERP and WP are significant positively at 1% level in the three different regression models.
［Insert Table 6 here］
To support the views above, Table 7 and Table 8 provide additional evidences. We further perform comparison among 6 different housing categories, namely elevator building, townhouse, store, apartment, suite room and office. This comparison is a direct test of anchoring effect on different housing types. In addition to the office category, we found the coefficients of BREFERP to be significantly positive in the semi-log and box-cox regression models. Therefore, it again validated our hypothesis 1.
Take elevator building for sample, the coefficients of F1 and LIVINGS are negative significantly associated with WP, implying homebuyers do not like the first floor because of it don't has a "good view" and in general the limited space, homebuyers often do not prefer too much living rooms. Based the above two reasons, the homebuyers are willing to pay a lower price for elevator building with such characteristics. From the samples of townhouse show that the coefficient of YEAR is negative significantly associated with WP. It means that fast soaring house prices and economy deteriorate in recent years, lead to homebuyers no ability to buy high-priced townhouses in Taiwan. For the samples of store, the coefficients of DISTANCE is marginal negative significantly associated with WP, reflecting investors purchase real estates as stores, they don't care about the distance between the stores and the original houses. Because of these investors to buy the stores, the main purpose is to be able to make money rather than distance. For the samples of apartment, it is the same with the elevator building limited space, homebuyers often do not prefer too much living rooms.
In addition, we also found that the coefficient of HIGH is negative significantly associated with WP. In general, disadvantage of the top floor apartment includes (1) Thirdly, after the financial turmoil homebuyers information uncertainties dramatically increase so they need to look for reference prices as a measure of the standard when buying a house. Fourthly, because of search cost and information asymmetry, spanned homebuyers are willing to spend more time to search for information and then they will reduce the relative willingness-to-pay. Finally, if the residential real estate located in the metropolitan areas can provide more information to homebuyers, then residential real estate buyers purchase metropolitan areas can away from the anchoring trap. Summarized the result above, we can know the degree of information asymmetry plays a very important role in the anchoring behavior of the real estate.
These results confirm that anchoring is an important cognitive bias in the behavioral finance literature, affects decision making by individuals in an important economic setting.
This large sample test complements the previous research that was largely based on small sample experimental work. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first one to use a large sample archival approach to understand the implications of the anchoring effect in a real estate setting. Although we focus on homebuyers' anchoring and price behavior in order to take advantage of a particularly rich data set, we expect that our results can be generalized.
The behavioral finance literature suggests that the level of anchoring should grow as the gap between rational value and market price increases in order to reduce the cognitive dissonance. Festinger (1957) states that cognitive dissonance "arises" when "persons sometimes find themselves doing things that do not fit with what they know, or having opinions that do not fit with other opinions they hold". Akerlof and Dickens (1982) were the first to investigate "the economic consequences of cognitive dissonance". The main purpose of this study is let government managers realize the existence of anchoring in the real estate markets and adjust their policy to reduce to this cognitive bias of buy-side investors. In addition, our study complements previous studies on behavioral finance of real estate. We consider the possibility that these residential real estates are mispriced because of the anchoring of buy-side participants. Consistent with this view, our results suggest that under the behavioral of anchoring are indeed mispriced residential real estates.
Our findings contribute to the literature in real estate markets as well as the setting of evaluation standard to reflect the real price of residential real estates. Turnbull, G. and C.F. Sirmans (1993) , "Information, Search, and House Prices", Regional Science and Urban Economics , Vol. 23 No. 4, pp. 545-557. Wilson, T. and C. Houston. (1996) , "A New Look at Anchoring Effects: Basic Anchoring and Its Antecedents", Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, Vol. 125 No. 4 , pp. Note. WP is defined as the selling price of residential real estate minus price concession. BREFERP is the Buyer's reference price of original residential real estate which is the MI-DLA, announced averaged regional land values. UNITS is the area of residential real estate. UNITS-squared is calculated as the UNITS multiplied by the UNITS. SMLPU is defined as the area of land divided by the total area of residential real estate. SMLPU-squared is calculated as the SMLPU multiplied by the SMLPU. LNAGE is the natural logarithm of one plus house age, where house age is calculated as the number of years from date of build to its sale date. PARK is defined as the number of parking spaces in residential real estate owned. SHOP is a dummy variable equal to one if the real estate is located in shopping district, zero otherwise. BEDS is defined as the number of bedrooms. LIVINGS is defined as the number of living rooms. BATHS is defined as the number of bathreooms. PRCO is calculated as original listing price minus final selling price. TIME is measured as the number of days between the date of the original listing and the date of a sales contract that eventually leads to the sale of the property. COM is the commission of residential real estate selling price. F1 is a dummy variable equal to one if the real estate is on the first floor, zero otherwise. F4 is a dummy variable equal to one if the real estate is on the fourth floor, zero otherwise. HIGH is a dummy variable equal to one if the real estate is on the highest floor, zero otherwise. STORY is the total number of floors of buildings. PUBLIC is defined as the area of public amenities. BUGE is a dummy variable equal to one if the buyer is a male, zero otherwise. BEXP is the age of the buyer. SEGE is a dummy variable equal to one if the seller is a male, zero otherwise. SEXP is the age of the seller. SPANNED is a dummy variable equal to one if the buyers come from out-of state, zero otherwise. DISTANCE is the absolute value of zip code which is the buyer currently residence minus the purchase of real estate. YEAR is the year of real estate sold. TURMOIL is a dummy variable equal to one if real estate is sold after the financial tsunami (2008 year), zero otherwise. SP*BUGE is calculated as the SPANNED multiplied by the BUGE. SP*TIME is calculated as the SPANNED multiplied by the TIME. BR*BUGE is calculated as the BREFERP multiplied by the BUGE. BR*TURMOIL is calculated as the BREFERP multiplied by the TURMOIL. BR*YOUNG is calculated as the BREFERP multiplied by the YOUNG, where YOUNG is a dummy variable equal to one if the buyer's age is less than 30 years old, zero otherwise. BR*ADULT is calculated as the BREFERP multiplied by the ADULT, where ADULT is a dummy variable equal to one if the buyer's age is between 31 to 45 years old, zero otherwise. BR*PRIME is calculated as the BREFERP multiplied by the PRIME, where PRIME is a dummy variable equal to one if the buyer's age is between 46 to 60 years old, zero otherwise. BR*ELDERLY is calculated as the BREFERP multiplied by the ELDERLY, where ELDERLY is a dummy variable equal to one if the buyer's age is greater than 60 years old, zero otherwise. (2) and (3). Coefficients are estimated by OLS method and Box-box method. VIF represents the variance inflation factor used to detect whether multicollinearity is an issue in model estimation. ***, ** and * indicates significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 This table presents the estimation results from the semi-log and box-cox regression to test the gender role in explaining the anchoring effect. Therefore, all samples were divided into Male and Female two groups. The dependent variable is the willingness-to-pay of homebuyers (WP), defined as the selling price of residential real estate minus price concession. There are thirty-two explanatory variables are included in each model (not shown (2) and (3). Coefficients are estimated by OLS method and Box-box method. VIF represents the variance inflation factor used to detect whether multicollinearity is an issue in model estimation. ***, ** and * indicates significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10. This table presents the estimation results on the two regression models which buyers come from the metropolitan areas with high-priced residential real estates to buy the metropolitan areas with low-priced residential real estates. In other words, the two regression models in Table 5 , the sample have two criteria: (a) the buyer-side is spanned homebuyers who come from the regions with high-priced residential real estates to buy low-priced residential real estates. (b) metropolitan areas. After excluding transactions data which not meet the above two restrictions, 651 of the original observations remain.
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The dependent variable is the willingness-to-pay of homebuyers (WP), defined as the selling price of residential real estate minus price concession. Note: t-statistics are in parentheses, and p-value are in brackets. Among the 651 sample residential real estates between 2005 and 2010, are used to estimate Equations (1) and (2). Coefficients are estimated by OLS method. VIF represents the variance inflation factor used to detect whether multicollinearity is an issue in model estimation. ***, ** and * indicates significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level respectively. (1) , (2)and (3) to mitigate self-selection bias. HB is a dummy variable equal to one if the buyer-side is spanned homebuyers who come from the regions with high-priced residential real estates to buy low-priced residential real estates, zero otherwise. After excluding transactions with non-HB, 1,959 of the original observations remain. There are twenty-eight explanatory variables are included in each model (not shown). Their detailed definitions and explains are provided in content. Note: t-statistics are in parentheses, and p-value are in brackets. Among the 6,956 sample residential real estates between 2005 and 2010, are used to estimate Equations (1)、 (2) and (3). Coefficients are estimated by OLS method and Box-box method. VIF represents the variance inflation factor used to detect whether multicollinearity is an issue in model estimation. ***, ** and * indicates significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10. 
Figure 1. The proportion of different house categories
This figure depicts the proportion of six different housing categories accounted for the entire sample, including the elevator building, townhouse, store, apartment, suite room and office.
